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An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth’s
Substantive Due Process Right
to Proper Preparation for Emancipation
MICHELE BENEDETTO*
Introduction
When Theresa was 11 years old, the San Diego
Department of Social Services removed her from her mother’s
home for neglect.1 Throughout the next several years, foster
home placement changes compelled her to change school
districts four times. Consequently, Theresa quickly fell behind
in her classes. At age 15, Theresa was arrested for shoplifting
a sweater and spent several months in juvenile hall. Upon her
return to foster care, she became discouraged and dropped out
of high school. With the support of a caring foster care
caseworker, Theresa passed the General Educational
Development High School Equivalency Exam (GED) at the
age of 17. For most youth, turning 18 marks a developmental
milestone; for Theresa, it meant being evicted from her foster
home. Like many 18-year-olds with no place to live, Theresa
slept on friends’ couches when she left foster care. Her

*

2002-2004 Equal Justice Works fellow at the Le gal Aid Society of San
Diego, Inc., and the coordinator of the Youth Outreach Project; J.D., New
York University School of Law, Root-Tilden-Kern Scholar, 2001. The
author is grateful to Colby Berry and Adriana Cordoba for their research
assistance, and Prof. Anthony Thompson, Prof. Colin Crawford, and Clare
Maudsley for their considerate feedback on early drafts. In addition, the
author thanks the Equal Justice Works Fellowship Program for generous
financial support. This article is dedicated to the memory of the author’s
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social justice.
1
Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004). Names
are changed to protect client identity.
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shoplifting record and lack of transportation prevented
Theresa from securing employment.
Finally, her friends’ patience wore thin, and Theresa
became homeless three months after emancipation from foster
care. She went back to her county caseworker to ask for help,
and was advised to go to an adult women’s shelter.
In the shelter, Theresa quickly spiraled downhill.
Several older women in the shelter, who had been homeless
for years, offered drugs to Theresa as a way to feel better.
Within weeks, Theresa was addicted to crack and living on the
streets. She sold her body to pay for drugs, and lost touch with
her friends from foster care. Theresa was incarcerated at the
age of 19 for prostitution and possession of narcotics. During
her time in jail, Theresa realized she had hit rock bottom and
needed to change her life.
In an attempt to rehabilitate her life, Theresa sought
support from community service providers after her release
from jail. She entered a supportive housing program designed
to rehabilitate drug offenders. As she recovered from her
addiction, Theresa worked to overcome her past, which
included sealing her juvenile court record for the misdemeanor
shoplifting conviction. A friend advised her to contact the
Youth Outreach Project, a program at the Legal Aid Society of
San Diego, Inc., that provides free legal services to former
foster youth. With the help of an attorney, Theresa received a
fee waiver from the court and successfully sealed her juvenile
record. As a result, Theresa found minimum-wage
employment within walking distance of her supportive
housing program, and began the difficult task of building a life
in the “real world.”
Unfortunately, Theresa’s story is a common one.2 The
state, acting as Theresa’s legal custodian, failed to prepare her
for emancipation from the sheltered world of foster care into
adulthood. Suddenly on her own, without the support of her
foster care caseworker, dependency attorney, or foster mother,
Theresa was overwhelmed with the harsh realities of life after
2

Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (2002-2004).
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emancipation. Although the government removed Theresa
from her natural home with the promise to take care of her,
she ultimately suffered extensive harm as a direct result of the
government’s failure to prepare her for adulthood.
Academics, lawmakers, and service providers have all
recognized the need for extended services to foster youth. To
date, however, none have acknowledged the constitutional
right of foster youth to be prepared for emancipation while
they are still in state care. This article contends foster youth
possess a substantive due process right to be free from harm,
and this right must include proper preparation for
emancipation. It examines the current plight youth face when
leaving foster care, and argues that youth who are unprepared
for emancipation face substantial harm as they approach the
age of 18 and beyond. Although recent federal legislation
improved the structure of preparation services for foster youth,
further legislative developments are necessary to protect
emancipating youth from harm.3
Part I of this article considers the current challenges
facing youth preparing to leave foster care. Youth are failing
to receive adequate preparation services while still in the
custody of the government. Consequently, emancipated youth
are disproportionately represented in homeless, unemployed,
uneducated, and incarcerated populations.4 Part II examines
the specific constitutional rights of youth in foster care. As
persons in a custodial relationship with the government, foster
youth have a substantive due process right to be free from
physical and emotional harm. This protection includes
services and training as required to “meet the basic needs” of a
child.5 Emancipation preparation services are required to meet
the basic needs of any foster child facing emancipation. Thus,
failure to adequately provide such services harms children, in
3

See 42 U.S.C. § 677 (Supp. 2002).
See discussion infra Part I.A-D.
5
Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d 851, 857 (Wash. 2003) (substantive due
process rights of foster youth include the right to adequate services to meet
basic needs of a child); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 31819 (1982) (liberty interests of persons in state custody require reasonable
training to ensure safety).
4
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violation of their substantive due process rights. Part III
criticizes the legislative response to the plight of foster youth.
Although federal and state legislative bodies are finally
recognizing the importance of services designed to assist
youth in the transition to adulthood, states consistently fail to
prepare youth for emancipation.6 Part IV therefore proposes
six concrete legislative recommendations, intended to
encourage the government to fulfill its due process
requirements and adequately prepare foster youth for
adulthood. Specifically, the article recommends mandatory
Independent Living Program (ILP) services, more efficient
ILP services, mandatory legal skills training, expanded
housing services, employment subsidies, and state statutory
reforms. Part V recognizes the government’s responsibility to
prepare foster youth for the “real world.”
I. What Happens to Youth When They Leave Foster Care?
Youth enter foster care for a multitude of reasons.
Some enter the system as babies, while others may have no
contact with a government agency until they are teenagers.
Some children are “voluntarily” given up to foster care by
parents who are unable to take care of them; others enter foster
care as a result of the government’s decision to remove them
“involuntarily” from abusive or neglectful homes. Extensive
challenges exist for youth in foster care, including multiple
foster home placements and repeated school transfers. In
addition, foster youth are more likely to suffer from medical
and psychological conditions. One study reported 50.6 percent
of foster youth interviewed had been professionally diagnosed
with a psychological disorder at some point in their
childhood.7 For many youth, trauma experienced in childhood

6
7

See discussion, infra Part III.
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS,

THE FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDIES,
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF FOSTER CARE: EARLY RESULTS FROM THE CASEY
NATIONAL ALUMNI STUDY 19 (2003) available at www.casey.org (last

visited Mar. 5, 2005). The Casey Alumni Study included 1,609 foster care
youth served by Casey Family Programs in 1998.
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follows them into adulthood after they emancipate from foster
care.
Former foster care youth are an invisible population in
America. Unlike other vulnerable populations, former foster
youth do not usually self-identify once they have left state
care.8 As a result, emancipated foster youth generally
disappear with little fanfare into mainstream society. Without
proper preparation for adulthood, however, emancipated foster
youth are at high risks for homelessness, lack of education,
unemployment, and incarceration.
With some exceptions, most youth who “age out” of
foster care do so at age 18.9 For the general population, the
age of 18 represents freedom: the right to vote,10 to join the
military,11 and to enter into contracts.12 But for foster youth,
turning 18 and leaving foster care brings a new array of
challenges. Without proper preparation, including a solid
education or vocational plan, emancipation can bring
unemployment and poverty. Failing to prepare youth for
emancipation before the age of 18 results in harm, which often
manifests itself after a youth has left foster care. Given the
high incarceration and homelessness rates of former foster
youth,13 society’s failure to prepare foster youth for the “real
world” is creating a new population of young adults in
poverty.

8

Interview with anonymous ILP service provider in San Diego, Cal. (Jan.
14, 2005).
9
The age of emancipation differs in some regions. Many states, including
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, and Washington, D.C., allow
foster care youth to remain in the custody of the state until age 21. In
California, youth may remain in foster care until age 19 if they are still in
high school, and until 21 if they have learning or other disabilities.
Telephone interview with Tammy Wilsker, Equal Justice Works Fellow,
University of Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic (May 12, 2004).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
11
10 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
12
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6502 (West 2004) (establishing age of majority as 18
years old).
13
See statistical data, infra note 23.
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A. Homelessness
Youth leaving foster care go to a wide variety of
places. Because foster care payments to foster families and
group homes officially end on the day the youth is
emancipated, many youth must move out of their foster homes
immediately upon turning 18. According to a national foster
care alumni study conducted by Casey Family Programs,
almost 10 percent of “permanent foster care” youth returned to
their birth families immediately upon emancipation.14 Many
youth return home in an attempt to repair the parental bond
previously severed by foster care. Although returning to
unstable homes can present new conflicts for vulnerable
youth, studies have found foster youth who retain connections
to their biological families fare better when they enter the
“real world.”15
Some youth emancipating from foster care may stay a
few extra weeks or months with supportive foster families
who are willing to keep the youth beyond the final foster care
payment. However, the 2003 Casey Alumni Study found that
less than five percent of youth extended their stays with foster
families.16 Other options for youth leaving foster care include
Job Corps, military service, psychiatric treatment hospitals, or
supportive adult living. The great majority of foster youth,
however, move directly to “Independent Living” after foster
care.17
Independent Living holds different meanings for
different individuals. For some youth, emancipation provides
the opportunity to live in their own apartments without the
restrictions of foster parents or group homes. Additionally,
Independent Living can be considered a crash course in
adulthood: Youth must quickly learn to adapt to the world of
14

CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 23.
Mark E. Courtney & Richard P. Barth, Pathways of Older Adolescents
Out of Foster Care: Implications for Independent Living Services,41 SOC.
WORK 75, 81 (1996).
16
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 24.
17
Id. (over 50 percent of youth emancipating from foster care go to
Independent Living).
15
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apartment leases, consumer and employment contracts, and
other adult responsibilities.
Certainly some high-functioning youth are able to
adjust in the “real world.” However, the high learning curve of
adulthood can be overwhelming for a foster youth on his or
her own for the first time. Failure to secure gainful
employment or educational loans can quickly lead to the
downward spiral of homelessness.
The proportion of foster youth who become homeless
after emancipation is stunning. The Child Welfare League of
America reported to Congress in 1999 that 40 percent of
persons in federally funded homeless shelters were former
foster youth.18 Indeed, a 2003 study found that 42.2 percent of
emancipating foster youth nationwide have spent one or more
nights homeless.19 Shockingly, 22.1 percent of youth were
homeless for one or more nights within a year after
emancipation.20 Almost one out of five youth (19.4 percent)
were homeless for a week or more after leaving foster care.21
In California, the statistics are even higher: A 2002
survey of California counties found that more than 65 percent
of youth leaving foster care needed some form of shelter.22
18

Challenges Confronting Children Aging out of Foster Care: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means Subcomm. on Human
Resources, 106th Cong. (Mar. 9, 1999) (statement of Robin Nixon,
Director for Youth Services Child Welfare League of America), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/humres/106cong/3-9-99/3-9nixo.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005) The Child Welfare League is one of the oldest and
largest organizations in nation devoted to social policy on behalf of
children. See www.cwla.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
19
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 25; see also Daniel J.
Brannen, Debunking the Year 18 Myth (Oct. 2002) available at
http://www.kidsathome.org/year18.html. It is notoriously difficult to
conduct research on former foster youth. Because of the transient nature of
life after foster care and youth frustration with anything representing the
“system,” emancipated youth often become unavailable for tracking
studies.
20
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 25.
21
Id.
22
See CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, INDEPENDENT LIVING
PROGRAM POLICY UNIT, CHILD AND YOUTH PERMANENCY BRANCH,
REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF THE HOUSING NEEDS OF EMANCIPATED
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Homelessness is different for former foster youth than for the
general population. Most emancipated youth do not go to
public shelters or avail themselves of homeless services;
having recently left the confines of foster care, emancipated
youth are not eager to stay involved with “the system.”23 The
large majority of homeless former foster youth are “invisible”
to the general public; that is, they are “crashing” on a friend’s
couch or sleeping in their cars.24
Under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance
Act,25 the definition of homeless children and youth includes
youth “who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime
residence,”26 as well as youth “sharing the housing of other
persons due to loss of housing, economic hardship, or a
similar reason.”27 Additionally, youth who have “a primary
nighttime residence that is a public or private place not
designed for, or ordinarily used as, regular sleeping
accommodations for human beings,” including cars, parks,
public spaces, are considered homeless under the federal
definition.28
Thus, applying the McKinney-Vento Act, all
emancipated foster youth sleeping in cars, crashing on friends’
couches, or sharing unstable homes are, by definition,
homeless. For any homeless person, lack of housing presents a
host of competing problems, including lack of food and
adequate medical care. But emancipated youth are already
facing an uneven playing field when they leave foster care.
Many are truly alone, without support from either birth
families or their former foster care community. Homeless

FOSTER/PROBATION YOUTH 1 (2002). Additionally, in a June 2004
interview with eight former foster youth in San Diego, all eight youth had
experienced some form of homelessness in the years after foster care.
Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster Care
Youth, in San Diego, Cal. (June 2, 2004).
23
Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8.
24
Id.
25
42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435 (Supp. 2002).
26
§ 11434a(2)(A).
27
§ 11434a(2)(B)(i).
28
§§ 11434a(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
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emancipated youth must grapple with both the realities of
unstable living and the lingering trauma of life in foster care.
Without proper preparation for life in the “real world,”
a temporary spell of homelessness can create lifetime
problems for an emancipated youth. Association with peers in
similar situations can encourage youth to join gangs to find a
sense of community. Additionally, as in Theresa’s case, youth
frustrated by a lack of resources and educational opportunities
may turn to drug use. Either of these options, which may be
tempting to a youth facing homelessness, can result in
incarceration.
Stable housing is the prerequisite to successful
independent living. Unless federal, local, and state
governments can increase housing resources for this
population, the negative effects of homelessness will continue
to cause substantial harm to the lives of emancipated youth.
B. Lack of Education
Education brings empowerment and can open avenues
of employment for a youth facing the “real world” on his or
her own. However, foster youth are more likely to fail in
school than their non-foster care peers. A 2004 survey of 732
youths by the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the
University of Chicago found foster youth:
[A]re at a higher risk of being held back a
grade, are twice as likely to have been
suspended from school, and four times as likely
to have been expelled.29

29

MARK E. COURTNEY, ET AL., CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT
FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH 42 (2004). The Chapin Hall
Center for Children at the University of Chicago is a research and
development center, conducting non-partisan research on children’s issues.
See http://www.about.chapinhall.org/index.html (last visited Aug. 27,
2004).
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Though the surveyed youth were age 17 and mostly in
the upper grades of high school, their average reading ability
was at the seventh grade level.30
Data from prior studies of foster youth in education
show equally dismal results. A rare national study of foster
care alumni in 1991 found only 54 percent of youth had
completed high school.31 More recently, a May 2002 study of
emancipating foster youth in California found only six percent
of females and seven percent of males passed the GED
exam.32 For youth emancipating from the probation system,
the numbers were slightly higher: Approximately 16 percent
of females and 14 percent of males passed the GED exam.33
Incredibly, these statistics show that incarcerated youth are
better prepared for the GED exam than foster care youth. In
addition, although 55 percent of emancipated youth attended
community college after exiting foster care, only two percent
actually earned an Associate of Arts (AA) degree. In contrast,
37 percent of general population students who attend
community college complete an AA degree.34
Legal problems can also prevent emancipated youth
from accessing education. For example, because most foster
youths’ social security numbers are accessible to many people,
identity theft is common. As seen in several Youth Outreach
Project cases, a youth applying for financial aid who is a
victim of identity theft may be denied the financial ability to
go to school.35

30

Id. at 45.
R. Cook, et al, Executive Summary to A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF
TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH:
PHASE 2 FINAL REPORT, at xiv (Westat 1991).
32
BARBARA NEEDELL, ET AL., CENTER FOR SOCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY, YOUTH EMANCIPATING FROM
FOSTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA: FINDINGS USING LINKED ADMINISTRATIVE
DATA 57 (May 2002) available at
http://cssr.berkeley.edu/childwelfare/pdfs/youth/ffy_entire.pdf (last visited
Mar. 5, 2005).
33
Id. at 58.
34
Id. at 60.
35
Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (2002-2004).
31
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The data is clear: The educational and foster care
systems are consistently failing to educate youth while they
are still in foster care, and the results of these failures follow
youth after emancipation. Lack of education, combined with a
lack of family support and social connections, relegates a
foster youth with no job skills to unemployment or minimum
wage jobs. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 35 percent of
emancipated youth received some type of welfare assistance in
the year after emancipation.36 By ignoring the educational
dilemmas of youth in foster care, society inhibits their
potential for success in the “real world.”
C. Lack of Employment
In addition to stable housing and educational
opportunities, stable employment is a crucial component of a
youth’s successful transition from foster care. Unfortunately,
foster youth are ill-prepared for the challenges of working in
the “real world.” In 2002, a study found that no more than 45
percent of youth who aged out of foster care in California,
Illinois, and South Carolina were working for income.37 In
2004, the numbers were lower; one study revealed that only
35.1 percent of youth who aged out of foster care in the
Midwest were currently employed.38 However, even former

36

COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29, at 43.
ROBERT GOERGE, ET AL., CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH AGING
OUT OF FOSTER CARE 15 (2003). Of course, some youth may begin
working prior to their 18th birthday, while they are still in foster care. The
Chapin Hall Center for Children found in 2002 that half of youth aging out
of foster care in California and Illinois, and two-thirds in South Carolina,
worked for pay before turning 18. Id at 11. Learning job skills while in
foster care is important; in addition to encouraging responsibility and
confidence, California, and South Carolina youth who did not work during
their time in foster care had only slightly more than a 50-50 chance of
being employed upon exit from foster care. Id.
38
COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29, at 46.
37
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foster youth who earn income rarely make enough to meet
their financial needs.39
The high unemployment rate for emancipated youth
can be traced to a number of causes. Lack of education, as
described above, prevents youth from being able to get stable
and higher-paying jobs. Youth without training in résumé
preparation, job interviewing, and work skills are at a distinct
disadvantage when applying for jobs.40 For many youth,
medical and psychological problems experienced while in
foster care were never fully addressed or remedied.41 Youth
who are currently homeless, or who experienced the instability
of multiple placements while in foster care, can have difficulty
adapting to a steady work environment.
Legal factors can also contribute to unemployment.
For example, unless a youth with a juvenile court record is
able to seal his/her record, the fact that a youth has a
delinquency record can work against him/her in the search for
employment.42 Such was the case of “Jana,” a 20-year-old
former foster youth who was arrested at age 17 for petty theft.
Although Jana had emancipated from foster care into a stable
living environment and was studying for a degree in
education, she was denied employment from two child-care
agencies because both refused to hire persons with
convictions.43 With the help of an attorney from the Youth

39

GOERGE, supra note 37, at 18 (mean earnings for California youth in the
first quarter after their 18th birthday is $1558.85, or $6,235.40 per year).
According to the 2004 Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines, the
poverty guideline for one person in the United States is $9,310 per year.
See United States Department of Health and Human Services, The 2004
HHS Poverty Guidelines, available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/04poverty.shtml (last visited June 25, 2004).
40
Some foster youth receive such services in Independent Living Skills
classes. However, such classes may not be the most effective way to teach
skills to this population. See discussion infra Part V.B.
41
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 24.
42
Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8.
43
Youth Outreach Project case study, San Diego, Cal. (May 2004).
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Outreach Project, Jana sealed her juvenile record and obtained
employment in an after-school program.44
For youth who are able to secure jobs, the workplace
can sometimes become a hostile place. Former foster youth,
who usually do not have family or community support, can be
easily intimidated by employers. Intimidation can take the
form of harassment, discrimination, and unpaid wages.45
These issues affect an individual’s ability to retain stable
employment, and present major obstacles for former foster
youth attempting to become contributing members of society.
D. Crime/Incarceration
Given the housing, educational, and employment
barriers facing foster youth upon emancipation, it is perhaps
not surprising that a disproportionate number of former foster
youth turn to crime. A 2004 study by the Chapin Hall Center
for Children at the University of Chicago found more than half
of emancipated foster youth had been arrested, more than onethird spent at least one night at a correctional facility, and onefifth reported being convicted of a crime.46
A clear connection exists between foster care and
crime. Although male foster youth are more likely than
females to land in the juvenile justice system,47 over two-fifths
of both males and females report a history of perpetrating
violence.48 Without proper support, including rehabilitative
counseling, housing, and job training services, youth who

44

Id. Many youth are not as fortunate, and their juvenile record remains a
problem into adulthood. See, e.g., Youth Outreach Project case files, San
Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004).
45
Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004).
Harassment, discrimination, and unpaid wages are the three most common
and most serious employment law issues faced by YOP clients.
46
COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29, at 48.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 50. Additionally, youth who have multiple placements while in
foster care are more likely to have a state prison record. NEEDELL, ET AL.,
supra note 32, at 72.
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learn violence early in life can find it difficult to manage life
on their own.
Those who have juvenile court records, and are on
juvenile probation before emancipating, are more likely to
enter the state prison system when they leave foster care.49
Approximately half of emancipated male youth with state
prison records committed violent or serious offenses.50 The
statistics are especially revealing for males who were on
probation while in foster care: Thirty-two percent of AfricanAmerican males, 18 percent of white males, and 42 percent of
Hispanic males who were on juvenile probation entered the
state prison system within seven years of emancipation.51
These statistics serve as a distress signal to
policymakers and service providers, and are even more
disturbing because each of these youth had some contact with
county services, through probation or foster care, before
becoming adult offenders. In addition, the statistics show
youth of color disproportionately commit crime,
demonstrating the failure of county services to adequately
address the needs of children of color.
Clearly, successful rehabilitation of juvenile offenders
must include preparation for life outside of “the system.” This
preparation should include the sealing of juvenile court
records and proper counseling to enable a juvenile to break the
pattern of criminal behavior. Without sufficient resources to
ensure stable housing, education, and employment for
emancipating foster youth, society may ultimately pay the
higher costs of incarceration.52 Indeed, failure to prepare youth

49

COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29 at 76. Indeed, nine percent of AfricanAmerican males, five percent of white males, and six percent of Hispanic
males entered the state prison system within seven years of emancipation
from the foster care system.
50
Id. at 71.
51
Id. at 77.
52
The average cost of incarceration in California, per inmate per year, is
$23,406. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, Support Proposition 36:
Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, available at
http://www.sfaf.org/policy/prop36.html (last modified Oct. 2, 2000). In
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for adulthood before emancipation can result in substantial
emotional and physical harm, for both individuals and the
larger community.
E. The Youth Outreach Project
In response to the dire legal needs of foster youth and
emancipated foster youth, the Legal Aid Society of San Diego
created the Youth Outreach Project (YOP) in 2002.53 With
generous support from the Equal Justice Works foundation
and Morrison & Foerster, LLP, the Youth Outreach Project
(YOP) was the first program in the nation to provide civil
legal services specifically to former foster youth and
emancipated youth.54 Through outreach clinics in drop-in
centers, and referrals, YOP is now bringing legal services into
the lives of this vulnerable population. In its 24 months of
existence, YOP has assisted over 125 clients in San Diego
County.55 The legal needs of the youth vary widely, from
major housing and education issues to simple parking ticket
disputes.56 Additionally, many youth are victims of identity
theft, often perpetrated by their biological parents.57 With
legal assistance, many of the barriers facing these youth can be
remedied.
YOP also focuses on policy issues affecting
emancipating foster youth. For example, several YOP clients
were unable to seal their juvenile records due to prohibitively
expensive court fees. 58 The proper sealing of juvenile records
ensures potential employers and most government agencies do
not have access to a youth’s juvenile record after he or she
turns 18. However, a youth must petition the juvenile or
contrast, providing a rent subsidy of, for example, $500 per month to a
former foster youth would cost taxpayers only $6,000 per year.
53
See Dana Littlefield, Former Foster Children Get Legal Help, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Dec. 30, 2003, at B1.
54
Id.
55
Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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family court to seal the record, and usually must pay a fee for
the court processing.59 Although most jurisdictions provide a
waiver process, San Diego required mandatory fees of up to
$120 to seal a juvenile record.60
Recent advocacy by YOP brought this issue to the
attention of the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Court in April
2004, and resulted in the establishment of a fee waiver process
for indigent people wishing to seal their juvenile records.61
The victory was significant; without a fee waiver process,
indigent youth would be barred from access to this court
service, resulting in yet another barrier to a youth’s potential
success.
II. Substantive Due Process Protection for Foster Youth
A. The Right to be Free from Harm
Clearly, the government’s failure to prepare a youth for
emancipation can cause substantial harm both before and after
a youth’s exit from foster care. In some cases, harm stemming
from lack of emancipation preparation becomes apparent
before a foster youth turns 18. For example, a parenting teen’s
lack of training for adulthood can result in the permanent
termination of the youth’s parental rights.62 In other cases,
such harm is manifested after the youth has emancipated, as
illustrated by statistical outcomes demonstrating foster youths’
challenges in the “real world.”63
59

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 903.3 (West 2004).
Id.
61
Memorandum from Dick Rothschild, Western Center on Law and
Poverty, Inc., to People Interested in Access to Court Issues (May 2004),
available at www.wclp.org/files/MAIL-22-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 10,
2005). See CAL. R. OF CT., R. 985 (revised Jan. 1, 2005) (establishing fee
waiver process for indigent applicants).
62
See, e.g., Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug.
2004).
63
Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8. The
concept of liability for delayed manifestation of harm may be analogized to
60
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However, because foster youth are in state custody, the
state has a duty to protect them from harm based on the
doctrine of substantive due process. In addition to “fair
process,” the liberty interest protected by substantive due
process “includes more than the absence of physical
restraint.”64 The jurisprudence of substantive due process
supports the extension of this protection to emancipation
services to properly prepare youth for life after foster care and
protect them from harm.
Substantive due process protects individual liberty
from government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement those actions.65 For individuals
not in government custody, due process provides defensive
protection from interference with rights. For the most
vulnerable members of society, however, the liberty interests
protected under substantive due process can become matters
of great importance. When the government assumes
responsibility for individuals in custody, such as youth in
foster care, it also confers affirmative constitutional
protections on these individuals.66 Therefore, because the law
grants additional due process benefits to youth in foster care,
the “deprivation of those benefits takes on constitutional
dimensions.”67
Courts have particularly appreciated the significance of
liberty rights for individuals placed into a custodial
relationship with the state, including institutionalized and
incarcerated individuals. Three Supreme Court decisions are
especially relevant in this context.

violations of school duties. When a school fails to properly teach reading,
the failure manifests itself in a child’s inability to read. Although the cause
of the problem is the failure to properly educate while the child was in
school, the evidence of the problem — the child’s illiteracy — is
sometimes not noticed until the child is much older.
64
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
65
Interport Pilots Agency, Inc. v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
66
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982).
67
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 993 (1991).
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In Estelle v. Gamble,68 the Supreme Court held states
are required under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishment clause69 to provide medical care to incarcerated
prisoners. The plaintiff in Estelle, J.W. Gamble, was a
prisoner with serious medical problems, including back pain
and high blood pressure.70 Prison guards repeatedly denied his
request to see a doctor.71 Gamble filed a complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging prison officials subjected him to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.72 The District Court dismissed Gamble’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.73 The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court
and remanded the case, ordering reinstatement of the
complaint.74 In considering Gamble’s Eighth Amendment
claim, the Supreme Court held prison officials’ deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious injury or illness is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishment clause.75 Because custodial prisoners must rely on
prison officials to treat medical needs, the Court held
government officials may be held liable for failure to provide
such care.76
The Court applied a similar analysis, though a different
legal standard, to the context of involuntarily committed
individuals in Youngberg v. Romeo.77 Nicholas Romeo, a

68

429 U.S. 97 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
70
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 98.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 104-05.
76
Id.
77
457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Estelle Court applied a deliberate indifference
standard to determine liability for violations of due process. However, the
Estelle Court’s analysis was grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In Youngberg, the Court
applied a more demanding professional judgment standard for
involuntarily committed individuals. A thorough discussion of this issue
can be found in Brendan Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional
69
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mentally retarded individual, was involuntarily committed to a
Pennsylvania state institution. While in state custody, Romeo
suffered numerous injuries as a result of his own violence and
actions of the other residents.78 Romeo’s mother became
concerned and brought suit in federal court, alleging state
officials knew, or should have known, her son was suffering
injuries but “failed to institute appropriate preventive
procedures, thus violating [Romeo’s] rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.”79 After the filing of the
complaint, Romeo was transferred to the hospital to treat a
broken arm. In the hospital ward and by order of a doctor, he
was physically restrained during the day to protect himself and
other patients. By agreement of the parties involved in the
litigation, Romeo remained in the hospital and did not return
to the institution. A second amended complaint was
subsequently filed, alleging the state was failing to provide
Romeo with “appropriate treatment or programs for his mental
retardation.”80
During an eight-day trial, a federal jury was instructed
on the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights. The jury was
instructed that only if they found the defendants:
[D]eliberately indifferent to the serious medical
and psychological needs of the defendant could
they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights had been violated.81
The jury ultimately returned a verdict for the defendants.82
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a
new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment
was not the appropriate source for the determination of rights
of involuntarily committed persons. Rather, according to the
court, the Fourteenth Amendment was more appropriate
Standards for the State’s Duty to Protect Foster Children, 29 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 385 (1992).
78
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
79
Id. at 310.
80
Id. at 311.
81
Id. at 312 (internal citations omitted).
82
Id.
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because the involuntarily committed “retain liberty interests in
freedom of movement and in personal security.”83 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the substantive
rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons
under the Fourteenth Amendment.84 While determining that
committed persons possessed constitutionally protected liberty
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause,
the Court found these interests require government to “provide
minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and
freedom from undue restraint.”85 With this decision, the Court
established a minimum level of affirmative state duties toward
individuals held in civil state custody. As mandated by
substantive due process, these duties include such training as
required to assure a committed individual’s safety.86 Although
the Court emphasized courts must show deference to
“qualified professionals” in determining exactly what
constitutes “reasonable” training,87 the constitutional liberty
interest in such training or services is essential to preventing
individual harm.
Seven years after Youngberg was decided, the
Supreme Court considered a third case regarding the
substantive due process rights of individuals in state custody,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Social Servs.88
Joshua DeShaney, a young child, lived with his physically
83

Id. at 312-13.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314.
85
Id. at 319.
86
Id. at 324. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted the recognized
liberty interest of committed persons includes such training as required to
“prevent unreasonable losses of additional liberty as a result of his
confinement.” Id. at 327. For example, if a person entered a state
institution with certain self-care skills, but then lost those skills “because of
the State’s unreasonable refusal to provide him training,” the person may
allege a “loss of liberty quite distinct from — and as serious as — the loss
of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints.” Id. In this way, the
ability to take care of oneself is just as essential as one’s safety. This is
especially true in the context of former foster youth. Without basic life
skills, emancipated foster youth face impossible challenges in the “real
world.”
87
Id. at 322.
88
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
84
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abusive father, who beat him on numerous occasions.
Although the county Department of Social Services was aware
of Joshua’s violent home life and took “various steps to
protect him,” they did not act to remove Joshua from his
father’s custody. 89 Indeed, although the Department was
notified repeatedly by hospital emergency room staff that
Joshua was being treated for suspected child abuse, the county
did not take action. Ultimately, after a series of beatings,
Joshua’s father beat him severely and caused permanent brain
damage, rendering Joshua “profoundly retarded.”90
Joshua’s mother and guardian ad litem filed suit on his
behalf against the county, the Department of Social Services,
and several of its employees. The suit, brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleged the state’s failure to intervene to
protect Joshua “against a risk of violence at his father’s hands
of which they knew or should have known”91 violated
Joshua’s Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty and due
process of law.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the
state defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal,
finding the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require a state or local government entity to protect
citizens from “private violence, or other mishaps not
attributable to the conduct of its employees.”92
The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision,
affirmed the lower courts’ decision.93 The Court held the state
does not have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect a child
who has been in the parent’s custody at all times.94 However,
the Court recognized that “in certain limited circumstances the
Constitution imposed upon the State affirmative duties of care
and protection with respect to particular individuals.”95 In
addition, the Court also noted the possibility that due process
89

Id. at 189.
Id.
91
Id. at 193.
92
Id. at 194.
93
Id. at 190.
94
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
95
Id. at 198.
90
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rights could exist in the context of foster care. In a famed
footnote, the Court suggested that:
[H]ad the State by the affirmative exercise of
its power removed Joshua from free society and
placed him in a foster home operated by its
agents, we might have a situation sufficiently
analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to
protect.96
By analogizing the situations of foster youth with those
of voluntarily institutionalized persons, the Court recognized
in dicta that the government creates a special custodial
relationship when it removes children from their natural
parents to place them in foster care.97 Because foster youth
enter into a custodial relationship with the government, they
are deserving of the same protection and state duties mandated
by Youngberg.98
Much like Youngberg’s plaintiff, foster children are
placed “in a custodial environment, and …[are] unable to seek
alternative living arrangements.”99 When the state accepts a
child into foster care, it assumes responsibility for the safety of
the child.100 In addition, youth in foster care lose the freedom
96

Id. at 201 n.9.
Id. The Court noted the findings of several Courts of Appeals that foster
youth, as persons in state custody, have a Due Process right to be protected
from harm. See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d
134, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1987).
98
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. See Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep’t of
Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Doe, 649 F.2d
at 141 (“When individuals are placed in custody or under the care of the
government, their governmental custodians are sometimes charged with
affirmative duties, the nonfeasance of which may violate the
constitution.”).
99
Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
100
See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F. 2d
1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1991); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir.
1990); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (once a person is in state
custody, state has constitutional “duty to assume some responsibility for
[the person’s] safety and general well-being”).
97
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and ability to make choices for themselves, and must rely on
the state for basic survival.101
The Supreme Court has not yet extended the due
process rights defined by Youngberg to foster youth. However,
since DeShaney, numerous circuit courts have held that
children placed in foster care have a liberty interest to be free
from harm, giving the state a duty to protect them from such
harm.102 These cases reflect a nationwide trend of federal
courts expanding the substantive due process rights of foster
youth to be free from harm while in the care of the state.103
State courts are also recognizing the significance of
substantive due process rights for foster youth. In Braam v.
State of Washington,104 a class action lawsuit brought against
the Washington Department of Social and Health Services on
behalf of youth in foster care, the Supreme Court of
Washington noted that its decision to uphold foster children’s
substantive due process right was consistent with “the weight
of authority among our sister courts.”105 American courts are
clearly moving toward the expansion of substantive due
process rights for this population.
Since it is established precedent that foster youth have
a constitutional right to be free from harm, the question
becomes “not whether they are entitled to protection from
harm, but rather, how broad that protection must be.”106
Clearly, courts require the right to adequate food, clothing,
and medical attention for custodial persons.107 Also implicit in
this substantive due process protection is the “right to be free
101

Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 293.
See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc);
Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); Murphy,
914 F.2d at 846; Norfleet, 989 F.2d 289; Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep’t of
Human Servs., 959 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1992); Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d
982, 994 (10th Cir. 2002); Taylor ex rel. Walker, 818 F.2d at 794.
103
See, e.g., Nicini, 212 F.3d at 807 (“After DeShaney, many of our sister
courts of appeals held that foster children have a due process right to be
free from harm at the hands of state-regulated foster parents”).
104
Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d. 851 (Wash. 2003).
105
Id. at 856.
106
Marisol A. v. Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (1996).
107
Id.; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
102
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from unreasonable risk of harm, including a risk flowing from
the lack of basic services, and a right to reasonable safety.”108
This is especially true because foster youth rely on the state
for protection from harm.109
Courts have further defined this protection to include
the freedom from “unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions
upon their physical and emotional well-being.”110
Significantly, this right goes beyond mere protection from
physical harm and encompasses protection from psychological
and emotional harm.111 Because children in foster care are in a
developmental time of life, emotional and psychological
injuries can “cause more lasting damage than many strictly
physical injuries.”112 This is especially true for youth
preparing to emancipate from foster care. Notwithstanding the
possibilities of physical harm, failure to adequately prepare
youth for adulthood creates emotional harm. Along with longterm effects of emotional injuries suffered while in foster care,
the fear and frustration felt by many emancipating youth as
they transition to adulthood can cause depression and other
mental illnesses. 113
In addition to basic protection from physical and
emotional harm, courts have also recognized affirmative state
duties, such as a foster youth’s right to appropriate placement
108

Braam, 81 P.3d at 857.
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 993 (1991).
110
B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
111
White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects aspects of
emotional well-being); Marisol A., 929 F. Supp. at 675; see also LaShawn
A., 762 F. Supp. at 992-93; Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002,
1009-10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“the fact that the plaintiff’s injuries are
psychological rather than physical is of no moment.”); Doe v. New York
City Dep’t of Social Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Ashleigh Danielle v. Adriazola, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (2003).
112
B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1395.
113
A 2004 study found “foster youth suffer from more mental health
problems than the general population.” COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29,
at 31. These youth are at elevated risk of developing Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder and substance use disorders. The risks are especially high for
youth transitioning from foster care into Independent Living. Id.
109
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and case planning.114 A foster child’s recognizable liberty
interest additionally requires the custodial state to provide
training as necessary to prevent the occurrence of harm to a
child. Such training should be designed to include “adequate
services to meet the basic needs of the child.”115
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
considered the specific nature of services to be provided in
LaShawn A. v. Dixon.116 Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit
on behalf of foster care children and children who were not yet
in the system but were “known to the department because of
the reported abuse or neglect.”117 The complaint alleged both
statutory and constitutional violations in the administration of
the foster care system in Washington, D.C.118 At the
conclusion of a two-week trial, with substantial testimonial
evidence of the system’s failures, the court held the
government was liable under both state and federal law.119
The court found the rights of foster children to be
analogous to the rights of the involuntarily committed, such as
the plaintiff in Youngberg. The court further noted that:
[W]hether plaintiffs have a liberty interest in
any specific services is a … difficult question,
analogous to the question of training addressed
by the Supreme Court in Youngberg.120

114

LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 993; Palmer v. Cuomo, 503 N.Y.S. 2d 20,
21 (1986) (state has a state statutory duty to provide aid to youth in foster
care). Courts have found various due process obligations on the part of
states to assist foster youth in the exercise of their constitutional rights,
including the right to family association. See, e.g., Aristotle P., 721 F.
Supp. 1002.
115
Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d. 851, 857 (Wash. 2003).; see also
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982) (state must provide “minimally
adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety.”); Kevin M. Ryan,
Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: a Due Process Perspective,
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 271, 308 (1993).
116
762 F. Supp. 959 (1991), aff’d, 144 F.3d 847 (1998).
117
Id. at 960.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 961.
120
Id. at 993.
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The court emphasized:
[I]t is important to keep in mind that plaintiffs
did not come into the District’s care by choice
… . They are children and rely on the District
to protect them from harm and ensure their
well-being.121
The court held:
[T]o the extent that certain services, such as
appropriate placements and case planning, are
essential to preventing harm to the children in
the District’s custody … children have a
constitutional liberty interest in those
services.122
Following this reasoning, children in foster care have a
constitutional liberty interest in any service or training
essential to preventing harm. When the state fails to prepare
foster youth for life after emancipation, youth overwhelmingly
suffer from both physical and emotional harm.123
Emancipation services are therefore necessary for a state to
meet the “basic needs” of a foster youth and to protect that
youth from harm, both before and after they enter the “real
world.”
B. The Voluntary or Involuntary Distinction
Recent court decisions have distinguished the rights of
foster youth based on voluntary or involuntary placement into
foster care. Circuit courts considering the issue have generally
found that substantive due process rights attach to
involuntarily placed foster children because the state is
responsible for removing the child from the home.124 In turn,
121

Id.
LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 993.
123
See discussion, infra Part I.
124
See Yvonne L., 959 F.2d 883, 891; Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter,
818 F.2d 791, 796 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989)
122
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lower courts faced with the subject have restricted their
discussion of substantive due process rights, applying the right
to be free from harm only to youth involuntarily placed into
foster care.125 For example, the Eleventh Circuit analogized
the situation of involuntarily placed foster youth to
involuntarily committed individuals, noting:
In both cases, the state involuntarily placed the
person in a custodial environment, and in both
cases, the person is unable to seek alternative
living arrangements.126
Though this analogy is valid, it needlessly excludes
voluntarily placed foster children from the protections of due
process.
Such restrictive reasoning in this context has a
dangerous effect on due process jurisprudence. Although
courts are moving toward expansion of substantive due
process protection to include services for foster youth, courts
seem to be unnecessarily withholding such protection from a
significant proportion of foster care youth. Essentially,
children who are forcibly removed from their parents by the
state will have due process protections, while children who
were “given up” to foster care would not.127 In effect, these
recent court decisions are creating two parallel foster care
systems: one with constitutional protections for
“involuntarily” placed children, and one without such
protections for children whose parents “voluntarily” placed

(children involuntarily placed in foster care are situated similarly to a
prisoner involuntarily placed in an institution); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d
846, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1990).
125
See Ashleigh Danielle v. Adriazola, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (S.D.
Fla. 2003); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320, 334-35 (E.D. Penn
1993); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill 1989).
126
Taylor ex rel. Walker, 818 F.2d at 795.
127
See McMahon v. Tompkins County, No. 95-CV-1134, 1998 WL
187421, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1998).
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them in state custody. This distinction is arbitrary, and its
result is “neither acceptable nor constitutionally sound.”128
Moreover, faced with the difficulties of poverty,
parents are often forced to transfer children into foster care
because of circumstances beyond their control. As the
Supreme Court recognized in 1977, “[t]the poor have little
choice but to submit to state-supervised child care when
family crises strike.”129 Some struggling parents may believe
that transferring custody to the foster care system will result in
improved living situations for their children; if such children
were not entitled to the full spectrum of constitutional rights,
parents would have an incentive to keep children in troubled
homes until the state finally intervened. Such a result benefits
neither the state nor the child and family. Courts weighing
such issues must consider the full effects of denying
substantive due process rights to individuals equally in state
custody. The substantive due process rights of foster youth
must include adequate services, regardless of how they came
to be in the care of the state. Because exposing a foster youth
to “an unreasonable risk of harm violates the due process
clause,” states have an affirmative constitutional duty to
provide services designed to prepare a youth for life after
foster care.130
III. Duty of Government
Emancipating inadequately prepared foster youth into
the “real world” causes substantial harm, and the state
therefore has a duty to ensure youth are ready for
128

Id.; see also Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.
1990) (court held that the due process right to be free from harm extends to
plaintiff foster children, who were “relinquished” into foster care by their
grandfather).
129
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
834 (1977); Ryan, supra note 115, at n.176 (noting that studies suggest that
some social workers are inclined to favor continued placement in foster
care with a “higher-status” family over reunification with a child’s lowincome natural family).
130
Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d. 851, 857 (Wash. 2003).
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emancipation. Fortunately, both state and federal governments
recently recognized this duty and passed legislation benefiting
former foster youth. While this legislation provides an
excellent starting point for change, it falls short of truly
improving the perilous situations of youth living on the edge.

A. Legislative Response: The Chafee Act
Confronted with extensive evidence of the plight of
former foster youth, the federal government created the Foster
Care Independence Act of 1999.131 Former President Clinton
signed the act into law on December 14, 1999, and the law
was deemed a “great victory” for former foster youth.132 The
Act (Chafee Act) established the John H. Chafee Foster Care
Independence Program, named in honor of the late Sen.
Chafee (R-RI), who originally sponsored the legislation.133
The Chafee Act brought needed improvements to
Independent Living Programs (ILP) for foster youth and
emancipated youth.134 The purpose of the Act was to provide
States with “flexible funding” to “enable programs to be
designed and conducted” to assist former foster youth.135 This
flexibility was intended to allow states to serve children of
various ages and at various stages of independence, including
those under age 16.136 States are also allowed to serve children
and young adults in different parts of the state differently, and

131

42 U.S.C. §677(a) (Supp. 2002).
Raudi P. Guinn, Passage of the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999:
A Pivotal Step on Behalf of Youth Aging Out of Foster Care and Into a Life
of Poverty, 7 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y, 403, 409 (2000).
133
Id.
134
Independent Living Programs are designed to train youth for adult life.
Though the programs vary by state and county, most programs include
training (such as budgeting classes, résumé workshops, and interview
skills) and access to specialized caseworkers for assistance.
135
§ 677 (a).
136
§ 677(b)(2)(C).
132
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can use a variety of providers and contractors to deliver
independent living services.137
In addition to emphasizing state flexibility, the Chafee
Act establishes accountability for states as they implement
Independent Living Programs. The Chafee Act requires the
Secretary of State to develop outcome measures to be used to
assess the performance of states.138 Thus, as the federal
government monitors the provision of services to former foster
youth, states may be held accountable when they violate the
due process rights of youth by failing to prepare them for
emancipation.
Significantly, the Chafee Act doubled federal funding
for the Independent Living Program, from $70 million to $140
million per year.139 Funding is initially distributed based on
the proportion of the national foster care population residing in
each state, and states must provide a 20 percent match.140 If a
state fails to spend its federal allotment, other states may
request access to those funds.141
The law recognizes the unique situation of youth aged
18 to 21, who have emancipated from foster care but are not
yet fully self-sufficient. The Chafee Act calls for states to use
some portion of their funds to provide a range of services and
support for these aftercare youth.142 Each state is required to
implement Independent Living Programs to “ensure that all
137

§ 677(b)(2)(D) (states should involve the public and private sectors);
see also § 677(f)(1); Press Release, Child Welfare League of America,
Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (Nov. 23, 1999), available at
http:www.cwla.org/advocacy/indlivhr3443.htm (last visited June 25,
2004).
138
§ 677(f)(1)(A). The Chafee Act specifies these measures should include
educational attainment, high school diploma, employment, avoidance of
dependency, homelessness, nonmarital childbirth, incarceration, and high
risk behaviors. Id.
139
Press Release, supra note 137.
140
Independent Living Fiscal Allocations, Administration of Children and
Families Policy Manual 3.3B, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp_pf.jsp?id=3
(last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
141
Id.
142
§ 677(a)(5) (Supp. 2002).
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political subdivisions in the State are served by the program,
though not necessarily in a uniform manner.”143 States may
use 30 percent of their ILP funds to provide room and board to
emancipated youth until age 21, and states may also choose to
extend Medicaid to this population.144 These services also
include participation in ILP programs, educational
scholarships, and transitional housing opportunities.145 In
addition, with the passage of the Promoting Safe and Stable
Families Legislation of 2001, former foster youth may receive
educational and training vouchers up to $5,000 per year for
post-secondary education and vocational training.146
B. The Practical Problem: Delivery of Services
The Chafee Act represents a promising legislative start
to remedying the situation of emancipated youth. However,
unless states effectively implement the Chafee Act, the due
process rights of foster youth to proper preparation training
may be violated. Indeed, several issues with the legislation
have arisen since its 1999 enactment.
First, although states must provide comprehensive
reports to the federal government outlining their Chafee plan
and its implementation,147 advocates are concerned that selfreporting states are not always truthful about the level of

143

§ 677(b)(2)(B); see also Sylvia Junn & Jennifer Rodriguez, Out on
Their Own: California’s Foster Youth & the Inequalities of the Indep.
Living Program, 6 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 189, 193 (2002).
144
§ 677(b)(3)(B). California chose to exercise this option and provides its
state Medicaid program, titled “Medi-Cal,” to emancipated foster youth
until age 21. Technically, the transfer should happen automatically when
the youth emancipates. However, several youth have come to Youth
Outreach Project clinics specifically because their Medi-Cal has been cut
off. In most cases, the client’s Medi-Cal was either not transferred properly
or was discontinued due to clerical errors.
145
§§ 677(a)(1)-(6).
146
§ 677(i); see also National Resource Center for Youth Development,
State by State Fact Pages: California, available at
http://www.nrcys.ou.edu/NRCYD/etv.htm (last visited May 2, 2004).
147
§ 677(2).
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services detailed in such reports.148 For example, caseworkers
who are required to secure housing before a youth
emancipates should ensure the youth are actually housed
before they leave. Simply providing youth with a list of
homeless shelters, as is the practice in some California
counties, is hardly sufficient.149 In fact, providing a list of
shelters to a foster youth could rise to the level of a due
process violation; a youth would presumably be required to be
homeless, and thus not properly prepared for emancipation, to
access such shelters.
Second, state flexibility under the Chafee Act enables
each state to distribute Chafee funds to counties or political
subdivisions at its discretion. In California, for example, the
California Department of Social Services distributes Chafee
funds to each county to operate their own ILP.150 Although
each of the 58 counties in California offers some sort of
Independent Living services to foster youth,151 less than 50
percent of eligible foster youth actually receive ILP
funding.152 Counties may choose to contract such services to a
separate service provider, such as a nonprofit.153 As a result,
the efficacy of ILPs and their success rate with youth varies
from state to state, and even county to county.
This delegation of services presents numerous issues.
Lack of uniformity between counties results in disparate
148

Interview with Tammy Wilsker, supra note 9.
Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, San Diego, Cal. (May
12, 2004).
150
California Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Indep. Living Program, All-County
Information Notice No. I-40-98, at 1 (July 22, 1998), in CALIFORNIA STATE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR FOSTER CARE, FOSTER CARE
INFORMATION RESOURCES 10 (Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/getinfo/acin98/I-40-98.PDF (last visited June
25, 2004).
151
Junn & Rodriguez, supra note 143, at 195, citing LITTLE HOOVER
COMMISSION, NOW IN OUR HANDS: CARING FOR CALIFORNIA’S ABUSED
AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (Report No. 152) iii (1999), available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/report152.html (last visited May 8, 2004).
152
Id.
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Id.; see also Junn & Rodriguez, supra note 143, at 194. For example, in
San Diego County, ILP services are contracted out to three different
nonprofits, each serving a specific region of the county.
149
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treatment of foster and emancipated youth depending on their
county of residence. Service and benefit discrepancies
between counties and states can be detrimental to youth,
particularly when they move to less generous counties after
emancipation. For example, although some Florida counties
provide high school graduation expenses to former foster
youth, other counties do not.154 In Los Angeles County in
2002, foster youth received “the most generous ILP benefits in
the State,” including free laptop computers upon completion
of an ILP program and scholarships for college.155 However,
participants in neighboring Riverside County received only a
small monetary bonus upon graduation from high school.156
Essentially, a youth’s county or state of residence determines
the amount of resources offered to them, and thus their
potential for success.
However, the Chafee bill was specifically designed to
provide such flexibility to states; to some extent, discrepancy
in services is a natural byproduct of flexibility and is to be
expected. Also, freedom to experiment encourages states and
counties to offer creative services to youth. Service providers
can thus determine the most effective way to prepare youth for
emancipation, and can share such knowledge with other
regions. In this way, the flexibility of the Chafee Act promotes
communication between service providers of various regions.
However, as detailed below, additional legislative steps are
required to ensure that the Chafee Act sufficiently prepares
youth for the “real world.”
IV. Recommendations
The precarious situation of foster youth preparing for
emancipation clearly requires legal action. Litigation is
certainly a viable option, particularly a lawsuit filed on behalf
154

Email from Tammy Wilsker, Equal Justice Works Fellow, University of
Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic (Aug. 31, 2004, 16:56 PST) (on file
with author).
155
Junn & Rodriguez, supra note 143, at 196.
156
Id.
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of youth in foster care who recognize they will not be
adequately prepared for emancipation based on services
provided. Youth could argue inadequate services violates their
substantive due process right to be free from harm, and could
point to the outcomes of former foster youth who were in
similar situations to their own as evidence of the failure of
such services.
However, the government has already recognized its
duty to provide services, and the Congress made an attempt to
fulfill that duty through the Chafee Act. Concrete legislative
changes would therefore be the most effective and speedy way
to institute true improvements in emancipation services, and
protect youth from harm.157 Six specific steps would be
especially beneficial, and would assist the government in
fulfilling its due process obligations to foster youth.
A. Mandatory Independent Living Program Services
Independent living services are currently voluntary for
youth in foster care or “aftercare” youth, those who have left
the system but are not yet 21 years old.158 As a result, though,
some youth derive great benefits from ILP services, youth can
choose to have no preparation services before they
emancipate. Given the high rates of poverty and incarceration
for emancipated youth, foster care youth should not be
allowed to opt out of preparation for adulthood.
Requiring a base level of mandatory services for
dependent youth would ensure each youth is properly screened
157

Legislative improvements can also benefit other custodial populations,
including former prisoners as they are released into mainstream society.
For example, the U.S. House of Representatives is currently considering a
bill designed to address the needs of ex-offenders as they reenter
communities after incarceration. See Press Release, Legal Action Center 1
(June 23, 2004), available at
www.hirenetwork.org/pdfs/pr_reen1_finaljune04.pdf. The bill, titled the
“Second Chance Act,” would provide grants to States and local areas to
provide drug and mental health treatment, education and job training, and
housing assistance to these individuals as they leave state custody.
158
Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8.
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and provided services before moving into the “real world.”
Additionally, mandating ILP services at an early age, such as
12 or 13, would encourage youth to begin thinking about postemancipation plans before they reach the current ILP age of
16.159
Admittedly, mandatory ILP services may produce a
backlash, particularly among young people who do not wish to
have any more contact than necessary with “the system.”
However, the likelihood of screening youth in trouble and
providing services to them before they leave the system,
outweighs any potential backlash.
Although some consequence may be necessary for
failure to cooperate with ILP, punishing youth who do not
attend ILP services would be contrary to the spirit of the
Chafee legislation. This problem may be avoided by
mandating a very minimum level of mandatory services,
which need not rise to the level of weekly classes. Required
services could consist only of quarterly meetings with
caseworkers.
Naturally, adding mandatory preparation services for
every youth in foster care will substantially increase foster
care costs. However, as demonstrated by the statistics above,
the costs incurred by society’s failure to prepare youth greatly
outweigh the costs of additional programs. For example, the
financial expenditures required to incarcerate one individual,
or to provide extended shelter for a homeless individual, are
much more costly than case management or ILP classes.160 To
159

Id. Though some counties offer ILP services to foster youth as young as
14, San Diego County begins ILP services at age 16. Interview with
anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8.
160
The typical cost of an ILP class in San Diego County is slightly more
than $200, depending on how many youth attend. Teachers’ salaries and
administrative costs add up to approximately $50-$60 per class. Each
youth in attendance receives a $10 stipend; classes usually have
approximately 15 youth attending, for a total of $150 in stipends. Email
from anonymous ILP service provider, San Diego, Cal., to author (Aug.
24, 2004, 3:18 PST) (on file with author). In comparison, the cost of one
year of incarceration in California is $23,406. San Francisco AIDS
Foundation, supra note 53.
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avoid these greater social costs, Congress should act to require
a specific minimum level of ILP services for every foster
youth preparing for emancipation.
B. More Efficient Independent Living Services
Even youth receiving only a minimum level of ILP
services should be prepared for adulthood. However, many
youth involved with ILP emancipate without sufficient skills
for the “real world,” in part due to inefficient or irrelevant
training. For example, ILP classes on budgeting and résumé
writing may not be effective for a youth teetering on the brink
of homelessness. State legislatures and Congress should focus
their resources on ensuring ILP funds are spent in the most
beneficial way possible for foster youth.
Some jurisdictions, including Miami, Fla., offer
virtually no independent living services to youth aged 13 to
18.161 This fact is troubling, especially given the Chafee Act’s
(and Florida state law’s) directive to prepare foster youth for
adulthood.162 Five years after enacting the Chafee Act,
lawmakers should require more outcome data and information
about the success or failure of individual state programs. Such
analysis would enable service providers to design more
efficient Independent Living services.
Former foster youth themselves recognize the
limitations of relying on classes as the primary way to teach
basic life skills. Though emancipated foster youth in San
Diego County appreciate the commitment of caseworkers and
ILP teachers, many youth believe “the classes need to be
different.”163 Members of the National Association of Former
161

Email from Tammy Wilsker, Equal Justice Works Fellow, University of
Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic, (Aug. 31, 2004, 16:56 PST) (on file
with author).
162
FLA. STAT. ch. § 409.1451 (1)(a) (2004) states the Department of
Children and Family services “shall administer a system of independent
living services.”
163
Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster
Care Youth, supra note 22.
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Foster Care Youth in San Diego,164 recommend the program
“needs to be more hands-on information … kids need to do
more realistic things, like cooking and laundry.”165 The youth
were also concerned that incentives to attend class, such as the
$10 class attendance payment in San Diego, results in nonmotivated youth attending classes simply for financial
reward.166
From the caseworker perspective, even unmotivated
youth can learn something once they are actually in the
classroom. Caseworkers also recognize the value of a support
system for foster youth and emancipated youth beyond
schools and foster homes; for many youth, ILP classes provide
the only mechanism for supervised peer support.167 However,
emancipated youth themselves commented on the fact that
“some kids go [to ILP classes just] to hit on girls.”168 The
youth were also concerned about the difficulty of teaching
real-life skills in a classroom setting because:
[F]oster youth should be prepared, but not just
in the classroom… foster parents have
responsibilities [to prepare youth], and group
homes have responsibilities.169
The youth interviewed agreed that such money could be better
spent on housing or employment programs for former foster
youth.170 Such programs could be tailored to meet the needs of
individual children, creating more effective wraparound
services.
164

The National Association of Former Foster Care Youth is an
organization of youth in San Diego aged 18-26, all of whom emancipated
from foster care at the age of 18. The group offers peer mentoring to youth
struggling with the transition from foster care to adulthood, and works to
raise awareness of the issues facing emancipated youth.
165
Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster
Care Youth, supra note 22.
166
Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8.
167
Id.
168
Id.
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Id.
170
Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster
Care Youth, supra note 22.
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Although some additional costs might be incurred
initially to streamline services, making programs more
efficient would not necessarily require more funding. For
example, changing the focus of ILP classes could be
accomplished easily by ILP teachers, particularly with input
from youth themselves. Alternatively, eliminating classes
completely in favor of more individualized housing or
employment programs would simply require a redirection of
funds. Because Congress already deemed ILP services a
priority in the Chafee Act,171 increasing the efficiency of these
services would further congressional intent.
C. Mandatory Legal Skills Training
In addition to life skills training, foster youth should be
educated about basic legal skills required to properly function
in society. These skills include how to negotiate a contract
(including automobile, cell phone, and employment contracts),
the essentials of landlord/tenant law (including signing a
lease), and how to ensure a good credit rating. Failure to teach
these skills to foster youth has significant repercussions, as
seen by attorneys working directly with this population.172
For example, a youth’s failure to fully comprehend a
cell phone contract before signing it can result in
overpayments and improper charges. In one case handled by
YOP, a youth agreed to a cell phone store’s $500 cancellation
charge, in addition to the cell phone company’s regular
cancellation charge of $175.173 When the youth lost her job
and was unable to afford the cell phone bill and cancelled the
phone, she could not pay the resulting $675 charge. The bill
eventually went to collections and had a negative impact on
her credit report.174 As the youth herself reported, proper
understanding of basic contract principles would have
171

42 U.S.C. § 677(a)(5) (Supp. 2004).
See, e.g., Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug.
2004).
173
Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004).
174
Id.
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prevented her from signing this contract.175 Ultimately,
attorneys in YOP advocated on her behalf and her credit report
was cleared.176
Legal skills are especially important for youth entering
the workplace. Knowing that foster youth lack the
sophistication of experienced workers, employers may take
advantage of former foster youth employees. When YOP
began in 2002, attorneys were shocked at the number of
clients with meritorious wage claim cases and unemployment
claim cases.177 YOP brought several wage claims and
unemployment compensation claims from 2002 to 2004.178 In
each of these cases, an attorney’s advocacy successfully
secured monetary judgments on behalf of former foster youth
clients. 179 The pattern of employers taking advantage of
young employees with no family or social support became
apparent. With legal knowledge, youth would be better able to
protect themselves against illegal actions of employers.
Some might argue legal skills are not required for basic
levels of success in the “real world”; after all, many
functioning adults do not have access to lawyers or legal
services. However, these skills are particularly important for
foster youth. As a vulnerable population, one relatively small
legal issue can quickly become a significant barrier to success.
For example, “Joe” came to a YOP clinic with a simple
identity theft problem.180 When he was 14 years old, Joe’s
grandfather used his social security number to obtain a
fraudulent credit card. With this credit card, Joe’s grandfather
purchased a car in Joe’s name. Joe did not have any
knowledge of the car until he turned 18 and applied for
financial aid to attend college. With a $14,000 bill outstanding
on his credit, Joe was denied financial aid. Without any legal
knowledge, Joe felt college was now an impossibility, and he
worked in minimum wage food service jobs for two years.
175

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004).
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With the help of YOP attorneys, Joe learned how to clear his
credit and subsequently applied successfully for financial
aid.181 He is now attending college.
With the help of the private bar and legal service
organizations, mandatory legal skills could be taught to foster
youth at no additional financial cost. In YOP’s experience,
many private attorneys are eager to share their knowledge with
foster youth, through workshops, seminars, and individual
mentoring. Connecting foster youth to volunteer attorneys is
logistically simple, and can result in significant benefits for
emancipating youth.
D. Expanded Housing Services
Theoretically, foster youth should not be emancipated
from foster care unless they have a known stable living
arrangement. The Chafee Act currently allows up to 30
percent of all ILP funds to be used to support housing for
former foster youth. 182 However, given the prevalence of
homelessness among this population, a higher minimum
standard of housing support must be instituted by the federal
government.
To adequately support housing, Congress will likely
need to raise the current 30 percent cap on housing funds in
the Chafee Act. One potential objection to this action would
be the importance of other areas of training for foster youth,
such as employment skills or education training. However,
housing must be a priority; without stable housing, most youth
are unable to achieve stability in other areas, including work
and school. Additionally, as mentioned above, society will
ultimately pay financial costs in the form of shelters or
incarceration for youth who emancipate into homelessness.
The government should therefore ensure each foster
youth has some sort of housing for the first 12 months after
emancipation. This initial housing should span the spectrum of
181
182

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 677(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2002).
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housing needs for this population, including emergency
shelters specifically for former foster youth (to prevent their
association with the adult homeless population), and
transitional living places for more independent youth.
In New York City, a model program called “The
Chelsea Foyer” provides a supportive housing-based job
training program for 40 young adults.183 The 18 to 24 month
individualized program includes a congregate living setting,
onsite case management, and connections to job training and
placement, education, and life-skills development resources.184
This type of wraparound service model, offering personalized
assistance to help youth achieve the “independent living and
employment skills necessary to obtain affordable housing,”
could be successful throughout the country.185 Though the
financial cost of providing such services to a large population
of former foster youth would likely be substantial, the
potential for youth to be successful in all areas of life would
ultimately reduce social costs.
Housing support could also take the form of housing
vouchers for former foster youth. For example, a pilot
program providing county-funded housing vouchers to former
foster youth has been very successful in San Diego County.186
Emancipated foster youth who are employed may be
eligible for the “HOME” program, which requires a youth to
pay for rent with 30 percent of his/her income with San Diego
County paying the remainder.187 Admittedly, the program has
shortcomings. Though the program has a high success rate, it
only serves high-functioning youth who are nearly
183

Good Shepard Services, Residential Services, available at
http://www.goodshepherds.org/sub-programs_services/
ps-residential_services.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
184
Id.
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Id. A similar supportive housing program is also being offered through
the First Place Fund for Youth, a nonprofit in Oakland, Cal. See First Place
Fund for Youth, Supportive Housing Program, available at
http://www.firstplacefund.org/programs/shp-main.html (last visited Sept.
16, 2004).
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independent already.188 Additionally, the program’s long
waiting list has made it impracticable for many youth leaving
foster care. 189 However, even with these issues, the HOME
program represents a creative response to the housing crisis of
former foster youth.
E. Employment Subsidies
In addition to safe housing, stable employment is a
major obstacle for many former foster youth, who do not have
the interview skills or job experience to be competitive in
today’s job market. Providing partial monetary subsidies to
employers hiring former foster youth in entry-level positions
would promote the employability of this population. In many
cases, once a youth has secured his/her first entry-level job,
stable employment becomes a less intimidating goal.190
Employment subsidies are especially plausible due to
Congress’ recent focus on educational and vocational
scholarships. In 2001, Congress added a sixth purpose to the
Chafee Bill providing for educational vouchers for former
foster youth.191 Congress clearly recognizes the need for foster
youth to obtain needed skills to become competitive jobseekers. Employment subsidies are a natural next step,
enabling emancipated youth who obtained job skills to utilize
these skills in a “real world” work environment.192
The subsidies may take a variety of forms, including
provision of a monetary bonus or tax credit for employers
hiring former foster youth. Some might contend subsidies
“brand” youth in the working world, implying that employees
identified as former foster youth might be subject to
188
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discrimination in the workplace. However, the possibility of
discrimination is not enough to outweigh the benefits of real
work experience. Additionally, with training in basic legal
skills, youth would be able to properly report such
discrimination. Opponents might further argue that youth will
become dependent on subsidies and will not learn how to find
work in the “real world” without assistance. To prevent this
situation, subsidies may be offered to youth on a one-time
basis, simply to enable youth to “get their foot in the door” of
the working world. In addition to providing youth with muchneeded work experience, federal or state employment
subsidies for this population would send a message to the
general public: We must all work together to integrate former
foster youth into mainstream society.
F. State Statutory Reforms
In addition to federal legislative reforms, states also
play an important role in improving the lives of former foster
youth. State statutes governing the emancipation of foster
youth provide an opportunity for expanded emancipation
services. For example, Florida Statute section 409.1451,
passed in 2004, is designed to implement Chafee Act funds
more effectively.193 The law specifically provides for aftercare
support services for young adults formerly in foster care,
including but not limited to (a) mentoring/tutoring, (b) mental
health services and substance abuse counseling, (c) life skills
classes (including credit management and preventive health
services), (d) parenting classes, (e) job skills training, (f)
counselor consultations, and (g) temporary financial
assistance.194 The law also enables foster youth as young as 13
to be eligible for similar services, called “preindependent
living services.”195 Additionally, the Florida legislature gave
power to the judiciary to ensure compliance with the statute. If
the court determines a county department has not complied
193

FLA. STAT. ch. § 409.1451 (2004).
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with its obligations to provide ILS services to an individual
child, the court “shall give the department 30 days within
which to comply and, on failure to comply … the department
may be held in contempt.”196 Thus, counties will be held
accountable to the court for failure to provide services to
foster youth and former foster youth. The law has been
criticized for taking money away from youth because counties
required to pay penalties will have less funds for direct foster
youth services.197 Even with this criticism, the law reflects the
favorable intent of Florida’s legislature to strengthen the
delivery of ILP services.
In New York, state law defines a foster child as a
person (i) under the age of 18; or (ii) between the ages of 18
and 21 but consented to remain in foster care past his/her 19th
birthday, and (a) is a student at a school, college, or university;
(b) is attending a vocational or technical training course; (c)
lacks the skills or ability to live independently.198 With this
definition, foster youth may remain in the system until they
are actually prepared for independent living. This type of
statute should be adopted in other jurisdictions to ensure youth
emancipating from foster care are actually able to live selfsufficiently.
In California, Welfare & Institutions Code section 391
states the court may retain jurisdiction over a foster child
unless the government has provided the child with specific
documentation, assistance in securing housing and
employment, assistance in applying for college or a vocational
training program, and assistance in maintaining important
relationships with the child.199 However, in some counties,
simply providing brochures to a foster child regarding
employment, housing or education constitutes “assistance.”200
196
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Clearly, this minimal action does not ensure the emancipated
youth is successful in those areas.
Advocates are therefore working to specify a standard
for assistance before a youth leaves juvenile court jurisdiction.
Prof. Robert Fellmeth at the Children’s Advocacy Institute in
San Diego is working to define exactly what the court must do
to fulfill this statutory section before emancipating a foster
youth.201 He argues the statutory intent requires youth be
provided with education, health, housing, and employment
arrangements to allow independent living.202 Few counties are
currently complying with this interpretation.203 The fact state
legislatures are increasingly recognizing the need for more
effective Independent Living Services is promising, but states
must now take further steps to ensure the proper
implementation of such statutes.
V. Conclusion
As shown in the case of Theresa, youth preparing to
emancipate from foster care face extensive challenges in the
transition to adulthood. Because foster youth are in state
custody, they possess a Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process right to government protection from harm.
However, to adequately protect children, this right must
include proper emancipation services and training for
adulthood. Sadly, it is not only foster youth who are harmed
by our failure to prepare them properly for emancipation.
Society also pays a price for the poverty of former foster youth
through incarceration costs, homelessness and shelter costs,
and crime. Children in foster care still have a chance, but it is
the government’s responsibility to ensure their preparation for
the “real world.”
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